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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is an attempt to give an account of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction both inside and outside of physical theory, which is 
sufficiently non-technical to be followed by a reader whose background 
in science is not extensive, but it has been necessary to consider 
problems connected with physical science in order to bring out the 
features of the analytic-synthetic distinction that seem to be the most 
important. This paper, then, fights on two fronts; it tries to ‘defend’ the 
distinction since there is somewhat newer danger of denying its existence 
altogether, while attacking its extensive abuse by philosophers, which is 
nevertheless an error. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Through all of Kant's philosophy, his most enduring legacy has surely been 
the analytic-synthetic distinction. Disputes over what particular statements are 
analytic or synthetic aside, most philosophers today accept the distinction, in some 
form or other, as legitimate. Quine's (1990) influential attack on the distinction in 
"The Two Dogmas of Empiricism" has reportedly had little impact on Kant scholars. 
Regardless of present-day philosophers' acceptance of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction, it is clear that it lies at the heat of Kant's transcendental idealism. Without 
it, his attempt to ground metaphysics in synthetic, a priori principles becomes a 
meaningless project. But more importantly, criticism of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction brings Kant's basic views about the nature of concepts and relations 
between them into question. This examination could be far more devastating, or 
illuminating, to Kantianism than a simple elimination of the analytic-synthetic 
distinction.  
In this paper, I will examine how Kant draws the distinction between the 
analytic and the synthetic, through the criteria of conceptual containment, identity, 
and the principle of contradiction. I will use those criteria as a way of critically 
investigating Kant's implicit view of concepts. Finally, I will briefly discuss Quine's 
alternative hypothesis for the analytic-synthetic distinction, and propose my own 
alternative view of the facts which (at least some) philosophers may misuse in 
erroneously accepting the distinction.  
THE ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC 
 
a. Separating the analytic and synthetic 
Kant uses at least three distinct criteria to distinguish the analytic from the 
synthetic: conceptual containment, identity relation, and non-contradiction. These 
criteria, although seemingly disparate, are related though Kant's view of concepts as 
constituted by one set of a priori marks and loosely related to another set of marks, 
with each mark being itself a concept. By examining the view of concepts that 
underlies Kant's account of analyticity and syntheticity, it becomes clear that the three 
criteria are one and the same.  
In the introduction to Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1929) explicates the 
criterion of conceptual containment, which states that a judgment is analytic if the 
predicate "belongs to the subject" and is synthetic if the predicate "lies outside the 
subject, although it does indeed stand in connection with it." An analytic judgment 
adds "nothing through the predicate to the concept of the subject, but merely breaking 
it up into those constituent concepts that have all along been thought in it, although 
confusedly." The predicate of a synthetic judgment, on the other hand, could not be 
"extracted" from the subject by any form analysis.  
This criterion of containment relies heavily upon Kant's "notion of a concept 
as a set of marks (themselves concepts), which are thought together in 'analytic 
unity.'" Conceptual containment arises when the predicate "is itself either a mark of 
the concept or a mark of one of its marks." In other words, it is the interconnectedness 
of marks (i.e. concepts) that gives rise to the relations necessary for analytic 
judgments. In certain cases, the analyticity of a judgment is perfectly apparent using 
this criterion, as in the cases of "sparrows are birds" and "women are rational 
animals."  
In other cases, however, the analyticity is uncertain, such as with the 
judgments "desks are types of tables" and "viruses are living creatures." At least I am 
not sure whether a desk ought to be classified as a species of table or just as furniture, 
and the question of whether viruses are alive has not, to my knowledge, been resolved 
by the scientific community. Therefore, I cannot say whether these judgments are 
analytic or synthetic. One solution would be to rule these examples "judgments of 
experience," which would preclude them from being analytic, since judgments of 
experience are one and all synthetic." But as Kant (1950) states in the Prolegomena, 
concepts of experience can constitute analytic judgments, such as in the case "gold is 
a yellow metal," which "require[s] no experience beyond the concept of gold as a 
yellow metal." So, identifying the genus of "desk" or "virus" cannot, on Kantian 
terms, be considered moving outside those concepts and "appealing to the testimony 
of experience." And thus the problem raised by these examples of judgments of 
indeterminate analyticity remains.  
Grice and Strawson (1990), in "In Defense of a Dogma," discount the 
importance (and even frequency) of disagreement over when "analytic" and 
"synthetic" ought to be applied. They write that those who use the terms 'analytic' and 
'synthetic' due to a very considerable extent agree in the applications they make of 
them. They apply the term 'analytic' to more or less the same cases, withhold it from 
more or less the same cases, and hesitate over more or less the same cases.  
But this presentation of the difficulty of how to apply the distinction 
underestimates the seriousness of the disagreements over that application. 
Philosophers do more than "hesitate" over whole bodies of knowledge like 
mathematics, they strongly disagree. There is not even significant agreement over 
Kant's own example of"7+5=12" being a synthetic statement.  
Grice and Strawson might be warranted in dismissing the problem of 
disagreement and indeterminacy in applying the distinction if one of Kant's primary 
purposes in developing his transcendental idealism had not been explicating 
metaphysics as a science, i.e. as a system of "universal and lasting recognition." But 
because of that goal, disagreement over principles or application indicates a failure of 
the theory and thus cannot be disregarded as inconsequential, particularly when that 
disagreement involves so crucial a Kantian distinction as between the analytic and the 
synthetic.  
Another problem comes up concerning the criterion of conceptual 
containment, namely that Kant both asserts that (with respect to the example of a 
triangle) "the concept is nothing more than the mere definition" and rejects a 
conception of analyticity based on definition, since "'definability' is a stricter 
condition than 'analyzability’. In fact, Kant does not regard definitions of concepts as 
giving rise to analytical judgments; rather it is through analytical judgments that we 
seek to approach the definition of the concepts. And so what Kant thinks is actually 
contained in a concept remains obscure. It is also pointed out that concepts need to be 
sufficiently fixed, not dependent upon variable conditions of how much the judger 
knows about the subject of the judgments and on his arbitrary decision of the choice 
and formula of his definitions, in order for the classification of judgments into 
analytic and synthetic not to be arbitrary. Conceptual containment, due to its problems 
of under-determining the classification of the analytic and the synthetic, cannot resist 
such arbitrariness. But perhaps the criteria of identity or non-contradiction can.  
In clarifying what he means by conceptual containment, Kant introduces the 
criterion of identity, writing that analytic judgments are those "in which the 
connection of the predicate with the subject is thought through identity." Synthetic 
judgments are defined negatively as those in which the "this connection is thought 
without identity." This identity condition seems to only raise more questions. Surely, 
Kant would want to regard the judgment "humans have two eyes" as synthetic since it 
is an empirical proposition. And yet, in what sense is two-eyedness not part of the 
identity of humans?  
The answer lies in Kant's explication of the example "all bodies are extended," 
which makes plainer the implicit view of concepts grounding Kant's analytic-
synthetic distinction. In that example, extendedness (and impenetrability and figure) 
does not go beyond the concept of body, whereas weight does. Kant (1950) explains 
that one can "attach weight as a predicate to the concept" by "finding weight to be 
invariably connected with the above characters [of extendedness, figure, etc.]." That 
attachment is synthetic and an extension of one's knowledge. Despite that attachment 
however, Kant denies that we "include in the concept of a body in the general 
predicate 'weight.'" And so, even though "weight" is attached to the concept of body, a 
judgment connecting the two is still synthetic.  
This example illustrates Kant's implicit view (in both the criteria of 
containment and identity) of a division between what I shall call "primary marks" and 
"secondary marks." Primary marks analytically constitute the concept, and are thus 
without empirical content. In the case of "body," the mark "extension" is primary. 
Secondary marks are synthetically tied to the concept, and can be empirical. The mark 
of "weight" is a secondary one in relation to "body." Beck seems to notice much the 
same division when he notes that there seems to be a tacit distinction between two 
kinds of concepts, one being a concept of highly refined analytical or abstractive 
unity, subject to strict definitions, and the other being a looser complex of 
representations, more or less held together and expandable through the accretion of 
new experience or subject to restriction in content through the supervention of a 
definition.  
The warrant for this implicit distinction is left, as one might expect, 
completely unspecified. This division of concepts into to distinct parts does, in some 
ways, resembles the old essence-accident distinction made in relation to substances. 
But that distinction is on much firmer ground, in that it depends upon the ways in 
which a substance could change while still being the same substance, whereas this 
primary-secondary mark distinction has no clear boundaries.  
Those, which lack of distinct edges with respect to primary and secondary 
marks, re-creates the problem of the resolving disputes about the application of the 
analytic-synthetic distinction. Given Kant's goal of creating a science of metaphysics, 
to leave such an important distinction un-clarified is particularly deadly to his system. 
If we attempt to use this primary-secondary mark distinction to determine the analytic 
predicates of a concept, we shall immediately run into difficulty. In analyzing the "all 
bodies are extended" example, Kant writes that "to meet with this predicate, I have to 
merely analyze the concept, that is, to become conscious to myself of the manifold 
which I always think in that concept." But since we have attached (albeit 
synthetically) other predicates that "[belong] together with the concept," it is unclear 
how we can sort out the primary from the secondary marks, because the secondary 
marks have become part of the manifold, which always accompanies that concept. If 
disagreements between philosophers emerge about which marks are secondary and 
which are primary, there is little more than intuition (in the non-Kantian sense) to 
appeal to.  
So the criteria of identity seem to raise more problems than it solves. 
Nevertheless, it does help clarify the Kant's underlying view of concepts, which 
informs his analytic-synthetic distinction. His reliance on the principle of 
contradiction as the "highest principle of all analytic judgments" in the 
Transcendental Analytic and The Prolegomena sheds even more light on the analytic-
synthetic and primary-secondary mark distinctions.  
In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant (1950) states that the principle of 
contradiction must, therefore, be recognized as being the universal and completely 
sufficient principle of all analytic knowledge. We can determine the truth of analytic 
claims by appealing to nothing more than that principle, which Kant formulates as "it 
is impossible that something should at one and the same time both be and not be." 
That the principle of contradiction is a "sufficient criterion of truth" for the analytic 
also indicates that we should be able to determine the analyticity of a judgment by 
testing that judgment (or rather, its negation) against the principle of contradiction. 
So, for example, we can conclude that "all bachelors are unmarried" is both analytic 
and true, since its negation asserts a contradiction. Synthetic judgments, however, 
require a quite different principle from which they may be deduced, subject, of 
course, to the law of contradiction, namely "inner sense and its a priori form, time."  
This criterion for analyticity depends upon Kant's particular conception of 
contradiction, i.e. what it means for a judgment to assert that something both is and 
isn't at the same time. The distinction Kant draws between falsehood and 
contradiction once again illuminates the underlying separation of primary and 
secondary marks, the former of which constitute a concept's identity. Contradiction is 
"inner contradiction," whereas "if our judgment contains no contradiction, it may yet 
connect concepts in a manner not borne out by the object. . . and so may still, in spite 
of being free from all inner contradiction, be. . . false." Thus even though we have 
added the predicate "weight" to the concept of body, denying that all bodies are heavy 
is a mere falsehood, not a judgment of the form "a and not-a."  
With this criterion of non-contradiction for analyticity, Kant's view that it is 
only the primary marks of a concept form that concept's identity becomes more 
explicit. Although we know that all bodies have weight and although we have 
attached the predicate of weight to the concept of body, to deny "all bodies are heavy" 
does not involve a contradiction. The secondary marks do not constitute the identity 
of the concept, and so to deny them is not to assert that something both is and is not.  
Once again, the warrant for this conception of contradiction, including the 
distinction between falsehood and contradiction, is absent. The origin of the law of 
non-contradiction in Aristotle contains no such implicit view of concepts or 
distinction between falsehood and contradiction. In Metaphysics, Aristotle defines 
truth and falsehood in the following fashion: "A falsity is a statement of that which is 
that it is not, or of that which is not that it is; and a truth is a statement of that which is 
that it is or of that which is not that it is not." There is no distinction between 
contradictory and false statements; a false statement is defined as a contradictory one. 
Without Kant's false-contradiction distinction, there cannot be two types of classes of 
statements, determined by the negations of which involve a contradiction.  
Aristotle's account of contradiction is at least as plausible as Kant's, thus 
calling into question the justification for Kant's view. On Kant's own terms, we can 
wonder whether the distinction between falsehood and contradiction is a priori and 
whether the definitions that he gives are analytic. Indeed, we can wonder whether 
Kant's implicit view of concepts as having both primary and secondary marks is a 
priori and analytic. At this point, it begins to seem as if Kant cannot even get off the 
ground, because if he makes the a priori-a posteriori and analytic-synthetic 
distinctions, he must justify those distinctions in reference to his own theories about a 
prioricity and analyticity. If he cannot justify those distinctions, then they cannot 
serve as the bedrock for the science of metaphysics that he wishes to develop. But 
attempting to find a warrant those basic views in a non-circular fashion would be no 
small feat.  
 
b. Holism and Knowledge 
At this point, perhaps it is best to leave the attempt to clarify and justify the 
analytic-synthetic distinction behind, in order to attempt an alternate account of what 
philosophers are distinguishing in judgments when they classify them as analytic or 
synthetic. In response to Quine's "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," Grice and Strawson 
(1990) characterize Quine's position as indicating that he thinks that philosophers 
have been influenced to accept the analytic-synthetic distinction due to a bad theory. 
They write:  
Suppose that there were [sic] a particular mistaken theory about language or 
knowledge, such that, seen in the light of this theory, some statements. . . appeared to have 
this characteristic which no statements really have. . . [and others which] did not appear to 
have this characteristic, and others again which presented an uncertain appearance. (Grice and 
Strawson: 342) 
More precisely, Quine seems to think that there is an underlying correct view 
of knowledge (namely holism), which philosophers implicitly use. Because they do 
(on some level) accept holism, they regard some beliefs as more stable than others, 
and classify those beliefs as analytic. But because they do not accept holism 
explicitly, they do not see that all beliefs are, in principle, subject to revision, i.e. that 
the differences between the analytic and the synthetic are merely a matter of degree 
rather than one of kind. When holism is explicitly accepted, "it becomes folly to see a 
boundary between synthetic statements, which hold contingently on experience, and 
analytic statements, which hold come what may" because "any statement can be held 
come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system." 
(Quine: 211)  
I think that another account of what underlies the analytic-synthetic distinction 
can be made, without relying upon a theory as radical as Quine's holism. As was clear 
in all three of the criteria used to delimit analyticity, analytic statements are conceived 
of as those statements whose truth value can be known without the testimony of 
experience. But all statements necessitate some appeal to experience, unless one is 
radically committed to innate concepts. If we adopt this empiricist approach, the 
difference between analytic and synthetic statements is one of degree, not of kind. On 
the analytic end of the spectrum are those statements which require, in order to 
determine their truth value, no more experience than was necessary to form the 
concepts, whereas synthetic statements are those which do require experience in 
addition to those required by the concepts themselves. So, for example, the statement 
"my father is male" tends towards the analytic, because one cannot be said to know 
what fathers are if one does not also know that they are male. The statement "Sarah's 
dog is gray" would lie on the synthetic end of the spectrum, since one could know 
about Sarah's dog without knowing its particular color.  
By conceptualizing the grounding of the analytic-synthetic distinction in this 
fashion, it becomes clear that there is no longer a distinction to be made at all. Rather, 
there is a continuum of statements, based on the amount of information which 
establishing their truth value requires. The distinction/continuum is also highly 
relativistic, not just in the sense that statements can shift their position on the 
continuum through time, but that positioning will inevitably vary from person to 
person, based on their knowledge of (the referents of) a given concept. So, for 
example, due to my experience with horses, my concept "horse" is probably 
significantly richer than most people's, so that I would regard the statement "horses 
are taller than 14.2 hands" as much more analytic than most.  
 
 
 
 
THE CONCLUSION 
 
The explanation of the analytic-synthetic distinction, as in the case of Quine's 
appeal of holism, is not a new way of validating it, though in a highly distorted form. 
It is merely a suggestion as to why philosophers (and perhaps only certain 
philosophers) find the distinction plausible. But given the relativism of the distinction, 
along with the fact that it is no longer even a distinction (but rather a continuum), 
there seems to be little good reason not to retain it at all. And like Quine's holism, this 
argument about what the actual facts underlying the analytic-synthetic distinction is 
little more than a rough sketch of an account or a basic plausibility argument. But 
given all of the problems in clarifying and justifying the analytic-synthetic distinction, 
particularly in determining the criteria for analyticity and syntheticity, these rough 
sketches and plausibility arguments seem warranted. 
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